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Estate of MYH.TI~E J:;,. \VELCH, Deceased. AH.THUR A.
FAIRCHILD, Appellant, v. GgHALDINE F. ADAMS,
Respondent.
[1] Wills-Undue Influence-Definition and What Constitutes.The undue influence which will warrant setting asidE' a will
must be such as in effect destroys testator's free agency and
substitutes for his own another
will.
[2] !d.-Undue Influence-Operation on Testamentary Act.-To
set aside a will on ground of undue influence, evidence must be
produced to show that pressure was brought to bear directly
on testamentary act.
[3] !d.-Undue Influence-General Influence.-.Mere general influence, however strong nnd controlling, will not authorize
setting aside a will if it does not bear on testamentary act;
the influence must be used directly to procure the will and must
amount to coercion destroying testator's free agency.
[4] Id.-Undue Infiuence-Opportunity.-Mere opportunity to influence mind of testator, even when coupled with an interest
or a motive to do so, is immfficient to show undue influence.
[5] !d.-Undue Infl.uence-Evidence.-To overthrow a will for undue inf-luence, it is not sufficient for contestant merely to prove
circumstances consistent with exercise of such influence: he
must prove circumstances inconsistent with voluntary action
on testator's part.
[6] Id.- Undue Influence- Opportunity.-~The fact that testatrix' brother, in Jiving alone with her after her husband's death,
may have had opportunity unduly to influence her to change
her will so as to make him instead of her sister beneficiary
thereof is insufficient to establish undue influence, in absence
of evidence produced by contestant of influence bearing on
testamentary act or anything indicating coercion or lack of
free agency on testatrix' part when she executed the will.
[7] Id.-Undue Influence-Confidential Relations.-Te~tatrix' act
in making her brother sole beneficiary of will to exclusion of
her sister and certain nephews does not stem from confidential
relationship existing between testatrix and brother so as to
indicate any undue influence, where evidence establishes considerable quarreling and bickering among relatives when
[1 J See Cal.Jur., Wills, 3 13 et seq.; Am.Jur., Wills, § 350 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills,§ 78; [2] Wills,~ 81; [3] Wills,
§82; [4, 6] Wills, §99; [5] Wills, §134; [7, 8] Wills, §109; [9]
Wills,§ 95; [10] Wills,§ 147; [11] Wills,§ 264.
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on
Condition of Testatrix.-Testatrix' mental and
as to warrant
aside her will on
i!uence where evidence shows that she was a clear thinking,
deliberate woman, awan: of her
and financial
and that it was not until a few
before her
which occurred four years after execution of
that
her
condition dcterioratPd.
!d.-Naturalness-Discrimination Between Objects of Bounty.
testatrix preferred one
her
as
to other relatives, such as her sister and nephews,
such
does not make the will unnaturaL
!d.-Republication-Effect of CodiciL---Where testatrix made
her brother sole
of her will and two years later
executed a eodicil
him as
tlw exeeution of
the eodicil has effect of rcexecution of will and removes any
'""''""'v"~ taint of undue influenee which might be argued with
respect to its
procurement.

Id.-Undue Influence-Mental and

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles
denying probate of a \Yill and codicil. Clarence L.
,Judge. Heversed.
Hobert.~:.\.

,Jarrott and LeRoy Thomas for Appellant.

Austin, Austin, Jones & Chaffee for Respondent.
J.-'l'his is an appeal
proponent Arthur A.
Fairchild from a judgment
probate of a will and
codicil.
:B-,. \Velch died December 22, 1951. She was a widow
at the time of
her husband having died January 21,
1947. She had no children. Her heirs at law and next of kin
were two brothers and a sister. By a will dated February
27, 1947, she left all her property to one brother, Arthur A.
Fairchild; and by a codicil dated December 26, 1949, she
Codicil
validating will or codieil which was invalid or
inoperative at time of its purported execution, note, 21 A.L.R.2d
821. See, also, CaLJur., Wills, § 158; Am.Jur., Wills, § 626.
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named him to serve as executor without bond. Arthur Fairchild
the will and codicil for
Geraldine
F.
contested their
unsoundness of mind;
; and
lack
execution.
the
of due execution of both the will
the third
of contest was dismissed
motion of the
contestant. At the close of the contestant's case, the court
granted
's motion for a nonsuit as to the first
ground of
for trial
influence.
a vote of 10 to 2 the
in answer to
that both the will and the codicil were
special
procured
the undue influence of the
Judgment denying their probate was thereupon entered; and from
such judgment proponent appeals.
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury's finding of undue influence, and that the
trial court committed prejudicial error in the giving and
the refusal of certain instructions. It will be unnecessary to
discuss this latter assignment of error, for it appears that
appellant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury's finding must be sustained.
[1] In Estate of Arnold, 16 Cal.2d 573, at page 577 [107
P.2d 25], the rules governing the determination of whether a
testamentary instrument is the product of undue influence
are stated as follows: ''In an action to set aside a will of a
deceased person on the ground of undue influence, it is
necessary to show that the influence was such as, in effect,
to destroy the testator's free agency and substitute for his
own another person's will. (Estate of !Jfotz, 136 Cal. 558, 583
[69 P. 294] .) [2] Evidence must be produced that pressure
was brought to bear directly upon the testamentary act. (In re
McDevitt, 95 Cal. 17, 33 [30 P. 101].) [3] Mere general influence, however strong and controlling, not brought to bear
upon the testamentary act, is not enough ; it must be influence
used directly to procure the will and must amount to coercion
destroying free agency on the part of the testator. (Estate
of Keegan, 139 Cal. 123, 127 [72 P. 828] .) . . . [4] mere
opportunity to influence the mind of the testator, even coupled
with an interest or a motive to do so, is not sufficient. (Estate
of Ea,ston, 140 Cal.App. 367, 371 [35 P.2d 614] .)
"'The unbroken rule in this state is that courts must
refuse to set aside the solemnly executed will of a deceased
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the
of undue influence unless there be
''a pressure ·which overpowered the mind and bore
down the volition of the testator at the very time the will was
made." ' (Estate of Oleason, 164 Cal. 756, 765 [130 P.
872] .) " See also Estate of Carithers, 156 Cal. 422, 428
[105 P. 127]; Estate
38 Cal.2d 571, 586-587
83 Cal.App.2d 15, 19-20
[241 P.2d 990]; Estate
[187 P.2d 889]; Estate
83 Cal.App.2d 534,
Greenhill,
563-564 [189 P.2d 822, 191 P.2d 419]; Estate
99 Cal.App.2d 155, 168 [221 P.2d :310] Estate of Williams,
99 Cal.App.2d :302, :310 [221 P.2d 714]; Estate of Dobrzensky,
105 Cal.App.2d 134, 14:3 [2:32 P.2d 886]. In the light of these
settled principles, tl1e evidence viewed most favorably to contestant must be examined.
The testatrix Myrtle, her husband, and her brother Arthur
had lived together for a number of years. Arthur was a
prospecting mining engineer, and his work took him out of
town for weeks at a time. \Vhen Myrtle's husband died
January 21, 1947, Arthur was not living with them. Myrtle's
sister Geraldine made the funeral arrangements. In accordance with Myrtle's wishes, Arthur was not notified of the
death until two or three days after the funeral. Meanwhile
Myrtle and Geraldine decided that Myrtle should sell her
home in Compton and live with Geraldine in Long Beach.
Myrtle listed her home for sale with a real estate broker.
Each of the sisters then made a handi\Titten will dated ,January 28, 1947. Geraldine thereby gave Myrtle the use of her
house (not exclusively) for life, with the residue of the estate
to go to one of Geraldine's sons. Myrtle left to Geraldine all
of her property excepting $6,500, which sum Geraldine was
to hold as trustee for Arthur. Both Myrtle and Arthur had
received $6,500 from their parents' estate, and thereafter,
as they made successive wills over the years, each always bequeathed to the other this amount of family inheritance.
About February 1, 1947, while the two sisters were packing
Myrtle's belongings to move to Geraldine's home, Arthur
appeared at Myrtle's house in response to Myrtle's letter.
Geraldine testified that she saw the letter before it was mailed,
and that in it Myrtle asked Arthur to come and take hi!>
things out of the garage. Arthur testified that he had long
before taken all his belongings from the garage, and that
:Myrtle had simply written to ask him to come to her at that
trying time following her husband's death. The letter was
not produced at the trial. Immediately upon Arthur's arrival.
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a heated discussion developed. Geraldine testified that ''the
first thing" Arthur said was "Myrtle, now that Fred is gone,
you will have to make out a new will, and if you will everything you have to me, I will will everything I have to you."
Arthur pleaded with Myrtle to stay where she was and make
a home for him. Geraldine had a tantrum. Myrtle and
Arthur then went for a ride in his car. ·when they returned,
Arthur told Geraldine "Take your things and get out of here.
I am going to stay with Myrtle." Then Arthur and Geraldine
began to argue, whereupon Myrtle beckoned Geraldine to
come into the yard and Myrtle said: ''I have stood all I can
stand of fighting. You will just have to do as he says . . . I
will stay here until he gets his things out of the garage, then
I will ease him out without fighting."
Thereafter Myrtle and Arthur lived together in Myrtle's
home until Myrtle died. The real estate listing was cancelled;
and within a few weeks after Arthur's return, Myrtle and
Arthur made new wills. Myrtle made the will here involved
on February 28, 1947. She thereby left all her property to
Arthur. Its approximate value was $18,000. At that time
she was 68 years old. Arthur's will left to Myrtle $25.000,
part cash and part mining claims of speculative value but
apparently all that he had. Then almost two years later and
on December 26, 1949, when Myrtle was 70 years old, Myrtle
made the codicil here involved naming Arthur executor. At
the same time Arthur named Myrtle to act as executrix of his
will. No one except Myrtle and Arthur was present when
the wills and codicils were executed.
Myrtle was of a mild disposition and tried to avoid quarrels
with Arthur. 'l'here were disputes with the relatives over
the prevailing home arrangements between Myrtle and Arthur,
and Arthur systematically excluded Geraldine and her sons
from the house. However, Myrtle surreptitiously visited
Geraldine in Long Beaeh when Arthur was away on his frequent mining trips. There was testimony that about two
weeks before Myrtle died, Arthur arranged 'vith a mortician
for an inexpensive burial service for her rather than the usual
fnnrral; that dPspite Myrtle's illne~s of some weeks, Arthnr
did not summon a doctor until a few hours before Myrtle
died; that the mortieian found Myrtle's body filth? and
emaciatt>(1 in an unkempt bed; and that when the relativrs
heard of Myrtle's death, they arranged a proper funeral for
her at their own expense, which funeral Arthur did not
attend.
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this evidence the
found that Myrtle's proposed
will and codicil were the result of the undue influence of
Arthur. Motions for
the verdict
and for new trial were denied. Arthur appeals from the
entered on the verdict. He properly maintains that
the evidence upon which the
determined that the dislvhich
made of her
her will and
codicil should be set aside falls far short of the requirements
to the showing of undue influence under the established rules.
[5] It is not sufficient for a contestant merely to prove
circumstances consistent with the exercise of undue influence;
but before the will can be overthrown the circumstances must
be inconsistent with voluntary action on the part of the
testator. (Estate of Donovan, 114 Cal.App. 228, 233 [299 P.
816] .) [6] Arthur, in living alone with Myrtle, may have
had the opportunity to unduly influence her but there was no
evidence produced by the contestant so bearing upon the testamentary act or anything indicating coercion or lack of free
agency on the part of Myrtle when she executed the will.
[7] 'rhe heated discussion among the relatives upon Arthur's
appearance at Myrtle's home, when it was finally decided that
he and Myrtle should live together, occurred about February
1 and more than three weeks elapsed before Myrtle made her
will of February 27, 1947. While by that will Myrtle chose
to make her brother Arthur her sole beneficiary to the exelusion of her sister Geraldine and certain nephews, such
testamentary act does not appear to stem from a confidential
relationship existing between Arthur and Myrtle. Rather, the
evidence adduced by contestant was all to the contrary, affirmatively and effectively establishing considerable quarreling
and bickering among the relatives and Myrtle's attempt to
keep peace by not provoking any unnecessary arguments.
[8] Consanguinity of itself does not create a fiduciary relationship. (Estate of Llewellyn, supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 534,
562.) [9] Myrtle's mental and physical condition was not
shown to have been such as to permit a subversion of her
freedom of will or to negate her independent management of
her ovm affairs. On the contrary, so far as appears from the
record, Myrtle was at all times a clear thinking, deliberate
woman. aware of her property holdings and financial situation,
and 1t was not until a few days before her death that her general eondition deteriorated.
There was no evidence that Myrtle at any time after
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making the will
any testamentary intentions at
variance therewith. [10] While she thereby preferred one
relative, her brother Arthur, as beneficiary to other relatives,
her sister Geraldine or nephews, such discrimination did not
make the will unnatural. (Estate of Llewellyn, supra, 83 Cal.
App.2d 534, 566; see also Estate of Arnold, supra, 16 Cal.
2d 573, 588.) Arthur as heir of Myrtle's estate valued at approximately $18,000 did not unduly profit from her will, for
he had made his will leaving his property to her, $25,000 in
cash and mining claims. He and Myrtle had discussed his
mining interests, and she presumably was aware of their
speculative nature and the basis of their valuation as a prospective inheritance. Arthur was absent on frequent mining
trips for several weeks at a time, when Myrtle might have
changed her will, and yet there was no evidence that she ever
wished or undertook to do so. Rather, almost two years after
execution of the will, Myrtle added a handwritten codicil
to her handwritten will, on the same paper, merely appointing
Arthur as executor. Manifestly the testamentary disposition
of her property was then drawn to her attention, and yet
Myrtle did not elect to make any change. [11] While Geraldine argues that Arthur's conduct upon moving into
Myrtle's home following the death of Myrtle's husband operated to coerce Myrtle into making the will in question over
three weeks later, there was no semblance of a showing of
any pressure or overpowering activity on his part at or near
the time of her execution of the codicil. The latter act had
the effect of reexecution of the will and removed any possible
taint of undue influence which might be argued with respect
to its original procurement. (Estate of Baird, 176 Cal. 381,
385 [168 P. 561] ; also anno. 21 A.L.R.2d 823, 831.)
Contestant cites the cases of Estate of Snowball, 157 Cal.
301 [107 P. 598], and Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.2d 520 [154 P.2d
384], as authority for affirmance of the finding of undue influence here. But the facts of those cases clearly distinguish
them from the present situation. In Estate of Snowball the
contestant, a son of the testatrix, was practically disinherited
by his aged mother, who was under the domination of her
daug·hter and made the will in response to her daughter's continned importunitif's and in eonformity with the latter's
wishes. There was evidence of the testatrix' declaration of helpless submission to her daughter's control in the daughter's
presence, which was not denied. Also false representations relative to the contestant's previous inheritance from his father's
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will were shown to have been made by the
purpose of affecting the mother's disposition of her property
by the will. In Estate of Teel the testatrix disinherited the
contestant, her only daughter by a former marriage, and left
all her property-most of which had been aequired from her
former husband, the contestant's father, on his death-to her
second husband, to whom the testatrix had been married but
a few months and who was the proponent of the will in question. There was evidence that the testatrix had serious mental
defects including a suicidal mania, and that she did commit
suicide some eighteen days after execution of the will. Under
circumstances showing the fiduciary relationship existing between the proponent and the testatrix as husband and wife,
his "unduly profiting by the will, . . . its being unnatural,
and [his J activity . . . in procuring its execution," it was
held that there was "persuasive evidence of undue influence"
as found by the jury. (25 Cal.2d 528.)
.At most, the record here shows no more than that .Arthur
was so situated as to have had an opportunity to unduly influence the mind of Myrtle, and that his actions and
conduct at times might be regarded as suspicious; but to say
that from such evidence it may be found that .Arthur "overpowered the mind and bore down the volition of the [testatrix]
at the very time the will was made" would be to permit
Myrtle's will to be overturned not upon proof but upon
speculation. (Estate of Gleason, 164 Cal. 756, 765 [130 P.
872].) Moreover, the final testamentary act in question was
Myrtle's execution of the holographic codicil republishing
her will, and as to which there was not the slightest basis for
finding that it was the product of undue influence by Arthur.
(See Estate of Dobrzensky, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d 134, 144.)
Under the settled rules, it must be held that there is not sufficient evidence in the record on the issue of undue influrnce
to sustain the jury's verdict, and the will and codicil here in
question should have been admitted to probate as the last will
and testament of the decedent Myrtle F. Welch.
The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, .Acting C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Bray,
J. pro tem.,* concurred.
SCHAUER. J., Dissenting.-In my view thr eYidence, construed favorable to sustaining the judgment (see Estate of
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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Bristol (1943), 23 CaL2d 221, 223-224 [143 P.2d 689]; Estate
Teel (
, 25 Cal.2d 520, 526 [154 P.2d 384] ; Estate of
Jamison ( 1953), 41 CaL2d 1, 13 [256 P.2d 984]), amply
supports all essential implied findings of the jury. Accordingly,
I would affirm the judgment.

J.-I dissent.
Section 19 of article VI of the Constitution of California
: "The court may instruct the jury regarding the law
applicable to the facts of the case, and may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any
witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the case. The court shall inform the jury in all cases
that the jurors are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact
submitted to them and of the credibility of the witnesses."
(Emphasis added.) And section 371 of the Probate Code
provides "Any issue of fact involving . . . the due execution
and attestation of the will, or any other question substantially
affecting the validity of the will, must be tried by a jury
nnless a jury is waived . . . . "
The foregoing provisions make it abundantly clear that
fact finding in cases involving wills is as essentially the
province of a jury as in any other field of the law. I expressed my views in this respect in my dissent in Estate of
l;ingenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571 at page 588 [241 P.2d 990], and
I cannot refrain from reiterating here that the majority of this
court has, in this field of the law probably more than in any
other, violated express constitutional and statutory mandates
by assuming the role of the fact finder and reversing judgments based upon jury verdicts which have not only been
approved by the trial judge but have been affirmed by a
unanimous decision of a District Court of Appeal and where
this court has been divided on the very issue of the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict. In this case, we have
10 jurors rendering a verdict on the issue of undue influence;
we have an able and outstanding trial judge denying motions
for a nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding
the Yerdict and for a new trial; and three able and eminent
jurists of the District Court of Appeal rendering a nnanimons
decision affirming the judgment (Estate of Welch * (Cal.
App.) 261 P.2d 18 )-holding the evidence sufficient to establish the issue of undue influence. In addition to thr above
·• A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on N ovrmb;·r Hl, Hl;J3.
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we have Mr. Justice Schauer and
on this court--a
total of six judges in addition to the 10 members of the jury
-all of the opinion that the evidence is sufficient to support a
finding of undue influence.
It is impossible for me to rationalize or reconcile the
'""'n•.un of the majority here with any concept of the well
and traditional rule that an issue of fact becomes
an issue of law only where the evidence is such that only one
conclusion can be reached
reasonable minds. In other
words if the evidence is such that reasonable minds might
differ as to the conclusion to be reached, the issue is one of
fact and not law, and an appellate court is bound by the determination of the trier of fact. I say that I cannot rationalize
or reconcile the position of the majority in this case with such
a rule when we have 10 jurors and six judges taking the
position that there is sufficient evidence that the will and
codicil were procured by undue influence, and only five justices of this court taking the position that there is no substantial evidence to this effect.
I think it is time that this court should speak more frankly
in cases of this character and honestly state the basis for its
refusal to recognize the well settled and traditional rule
with respect to the question of when there is an issue of fact
to be determined. In the case at bar it is obvious that the
majority of this court has weighed the evidence and come to
the conclusion that it is insufficient to support a finding of
undue influence. In so doing the majority has violated the
Constitution of this state in depriving the litigants in this
case of their right to a trial by jury. The majority has done
this by substituting its view as to the weight of the evidence
for that of the jury, the trial judge, the three members of the
District Court of Appeal and two members of this court.
There is no question in my mind but that the majority
decision in this case is based solely upon the view that it and
not the jury or the trial judge should determine factual
issues in cases of this character. This view is in direct conflict
with the Constitution and statutes of this state, and in my
opinion a judge of this court who concurs in such a decision
is violating his oath of office.
To say that there is no evidence of undue influence exercised
by the proponent of the will and codicil over the testatrix
in this case is shocking to my sensibilities. The evidence shows
that when Arthur returned after the death of Myrtle's husband she had made up her mind to sell her home and live
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with her sister Geraldine. Arthur told her she should not do
"Myrtle, now that Fred is
so. At that time he said to
gone, you will have to make out a new will, and if you will
everything you have to me, I will will everything I have to
you.'' He then told Geraldine to ''Take your things and get
out of here. I am
to
·with
" He then lived
with
and
her under his surveillance and refused
to permit any of her relatives to visit her. She made a will in
accordance with his demands within three weeks thereafter.
He continued to live with her and keep her under his surveillance for approximately two years and then she executed
a codicil naming him as executor without bonds. He permitted her to lie in a filthy bed without medical or nursing
care when she was sick and
and would not permit her
relatives to visit her. To say that an inference of undue influence could not be drawn from such conduct is to disregard
that which any fair and reasonable minded person would be
justified in concluding if he believed the evidence on behalf
of contestants.
To my mind the evidence of undue influence in this case
is overwhelming, and the reversal of the judg-ment denying
probate to the will and codicil here involved will result in a
rank miscarriage of justice. I would therefore affirm the
judgment.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 28,
1954. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.

